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This paper presents a personal history of one strand of W. Ross Ashby’s many ideas:
using information theory to analyse complex systems empirically. It starts with where
I entered the evolution of the idea as one of his students, points out a problem that
emerged as a consequence of generalising information measures from simple to
complex systems, i.e. systems with many variables, shows how this problem was
eventually solved, and ends with how his idea of decomposing complex systems into
smaller interactions reappears in one of the most complex technologies of our time:
cyberspace. While nobody could anticipate the complexities that developed since,
Ashby’s idea of understanding complex systems in terms of manageable interactions,
which I call electronic artefacts, is actually practised today and cyberspace is again
worth analysing in information theoretical terms.
Keywords: communication theory; complexity; cybernetics; cyberspace; decompo-
sition; electronic artefacts
1. Personal preliminaries
In 1959, I spent a summer in Oxford, England to learn English. I was then a student at the
legendary Hochschule fu¨r Gestaltung in Ulm, now closed, which was typical of
avant-garde institutions. There, we heard about cybernetics, information theory, and other
exciting intellectual developments. Norbert Wiener had visited the Ulm school before my
time. At the famous Oxford bookstore, Blackwell, I bought two books, Ashby’s (1956a)
An Introduction to Cybernetics and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1922) Tractatus Logicus
Philosophicus. I cannot say I fully understood either of them at that time and I had no idea
that both authors would have a profound effect on my academic future.
Three years later I visited the University of Illinois in Urbana in search of a place to study.
I met Heinz von Foerster at the Biological Computer Laboratory. He mentioned that Ross
Ashby was teaching a course on cybernetics. I had no idea that Ashby was in Urbana and the
prospect of studying with him was decisive in my becoming a student at the University of
Illinois. I enrolled in Ashby’s two-semester course in 1962–1963. He became an important
member on my dissertation committee. The dissertation reconceptualised content analysis as
a research method in the social sciences but in one chapter I developed an information calculus
for what may and what cannot be inferred by this methodology (Krippendorff 1967).
Part of Ashby’s Introduction to Cybernetics concerned variety and constraints in
systems. Shannon’s (Shannon and Weaver 1949) entropy measures did not play an
important role in this introduction except in arguing for his famous Law of Requisite
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Variety (Ashby 1956, pp. 206–218). This law concerns the limit of successful regulation.
It states that disturbances D that affect the essential variables E of a system, which are to
remain within limits of a system’s viability, may be counteracted by a regulator R
provided the variety that R has at its disposal equals or exceeds the variety in the
disturbances D. In short, only variety can restrain variety. He discussed two kinds of
regulation, when regulators pick up the disturbances before they affect the essential
variables, anticipatory regulation, and when regulators pick up the effects of the
disturbances on the essential variables, error-controlled regulation, which involved a
feedback loop. Figure 1 shows these two kinds, T denoting what he called ‘table’, a
variable that responds to two effects, the solid lines representing the variety of
disturbances and the variety that a perfect regulator would require.
Today, Ashby’s Law of Requsite Variety is considered a generalization of Shannon’s
10th theorem which states that communication through a channel that is corrupted by noise
may be restored by adding a correction channel with a capacity equal to or larger than the noise
corrupting that channel. This may be seen in Figure 2, with solid lines representing the amount
of noise that enters a communication channel, reduces what the receiver gets from the sender,
and the required capacity of the correction channel R. This is how far Ashby’s Introduction to
Cybernetics went.
2. Ashby’s information theory
By the time I became his student, Ashby had developed many interpretations of his Law of
Requisite Variety, including that the ability to understand systems is limited by the variety
Disturbance T E
R
Disturbance T E
R
Figure 1. Ashby’s regulators R and two versions of the Law of Requisite Variety.
Noise
TSender Receiver
R
Figure 2. Noisy communication channel and correction channel R.
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available to the observer’s brain relative to the complexity of the system being
experimented with. Although the concept of second-order cybernetics (Foerster et al.
1974, Foerster 1979) was not known at this time, Ashby always included himself as
experimenter or designer of systems he was investigating.
It is important to stress that Ashby defined a system not as something that exists in
nature, which underlies Bertalanffy’s (1968) General Systems Theory and fuelled much
of the general systems movement. He had no need to distinguish systems from their
environment, or to generalise from living systems what makes them viable. Ashby
always insisted that anything can afford multiple descriptions and what we know of a
system always is an ‘observer’s digest’. For him a system consisted first of all of a set of
variables chosen for attention and second of relationships between these variables,
established by observation, experimentation, or design. He built many mechanical
devices and then explored their properties. One was a box – Heinz von Foerster later
called it the ‘Ashby Box’ – which had two switches and two lights, each either on or off.
He asked his students of a cohort preceding mine to figure out its input-output
relationships. This must have been a most frustrating assignment because every
hypothesis advanced to explain the box seemed to fail in subsequent trials. It turned out
that – while the system was strictly determinate – the combinatorial number of
possibilities that would have had to be explored far exceeded human capabilities. There
was a true answer, but one that could not be found by systematic explorations. Pushing
the limits of analysing complex systems became an important part of Ashby’s work. It is
now recognised that the ability to determine the nature of a system by observation is
limited to trivial machines (Foerster 1984).
Before fully embracing information theory, Ashby (1964b) had developed the idea
of decomposing complex multivariate relations into simpler constituents, using set
theory. This culminated in his influential Constraint Analysis of Many-valued Relations.
It defined a process for systematically testing whether a seemingly complex constraint
(within many variables) could be decomposed into several simpler constraints
(involving co-occurrences in fewer variables) and be recomposed to the original
constraint without loss. Figure 3, adapted from Roger Conant’s (1981a) account
of constraint analysis, demonstrates the two operations involved. Here, the result of a
constraint (of three out of eight possible cells not occurring), the relation R(123), is
projected onto each plane in two variables R(12), R(13), and R(23), and on each
individual variable R(1), R(2), and R(3). Then, the inverse of projections is used in an
attempt to reconstruct the original relation from some of its projections. Among the
four examples shown here, the first does not account for any constraint, the second and
third shows some constraint but not enough to reconstruct the original relation.
The fourth demonstrates that the original relationship R(123) can be reconstructed from
relations R(12) and R(13) and is hence simplifiable into these without loss: R(123)
¼ R(12:13). This graphical illustration suggests that the original relation is not as
complex is it may have seemed but not as simple to allow the three variables to be
regarded separately.
Ashby was attracted to information theory, not only because of his Law of Requisite
Variety, but also because it promised to generalise his constraint analysis to probabilistic
systems and finding an elegant algebra of relations. Shannon’s theory had distinguished
signals from noise or patterns from random variation, and raised the hope of separating the
defining properties of a system from accidental or irrelevant variations – all of which to
find hidden simplicities in apparently complex systems, a theme that guided much of
Ashby’s work.
International Journal of General Systems 191
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Shannon’s entropies largely served to quantify communication between a sender and a
receiver, measured at different points in time. The entropy H in the sender A, the noise
received by the receiver B gave rise to the amount of information transmitted T (stated in
Ashby’s terms):
Entropy in sender A: HðAÞ ¼ 2Pa[Apalog2 pa
Entropy in receiver B: HðBÞ ¼ 2Pb[Bpblog2 pb
Joint entropy in the channel AB: HðABÞ ¼ 2Pa[A
P
b[Bpablog2 pab
Noise: HAðBÞ ¼
P
a[Apa 2
P
b[Bðpab=paÞlog2ðpab=paÞ
 
Transmission: TðA:BÞ ¼ HðAÞ þ HðBÞ2 HðABÞ ¼ HðAÞ2 HAðBÞ
McGill (1954) and Garner’s (1962) uncertainty analysis extended Shannon’s measures
to three variables for analysing psychological data. Entropies:
HðABCÞ ¼ 2
X
a[A
X
b[B
X
c[C
pabclog2 pabc;
HAðBCÞ ¼ HðABCÞ2 HðAÞ;
HABðCÞ ¼ HðABCÞ2 HðABÞ:
Transmissions:
TðA:BÞ ¼ HðAÞ þ HðBÞ2 HðABÞ;
TCðA:BÞ ¼ HCðAÞ þ HCðBÞ2 HCðABÞ;
TðA:B:CÞ ¼ HðAÞ þ HðBÞ þ HðCÞ2 HðABCÞ;
R(123)
R(23)
R(13)
R(3)
R(1)R(12)
R(2)
Projections of R(123)
Intersections of Inverse Projections
R(1:2:3)
= R(1:23)
R(13:2)
= R(13:23)
R(12:23)
= R(12:3) R(12:13) = R(123)
1
2
3
1
2
3
2
1
Figure 3. Geometrical interpretation of the constraint analysis of a three-variable relation.
K. Krippendorff192
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Kr
ip
pe
nd
or
ff
, 
Kl
au
s]
 A
t:
 1
7:
56
 3
0 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
09
and, last but not least, the amount of interaction involving three variables:
QðABCÞ ¼ TCðA:BÞ2 TðA:BÞ ¼ TBðA:CÞ2 TðA:CÞ ¼ TAðB:CÞ2 TðB:CÞ:
Guided by the idea of his constraint analysis, Ashby saw the possibility of
decomposing unanalysed multi-variable systems into its constituent relationships among
fewer than all variables, manifest in non-zero quantities of the information calculus.
McGill provided this accounting equation:
TðA:B:CÞ ¼ TðA:BÞ þ TðA:CÞ þ TðB:CÞ þ QðABCÞ;
showing the total amount of transmission within three variables as the algebraic sum of the
three transmissions between pairs of variables plus the amount of interaction unique to all
three. Ashby explained the Q-measure as the amount due to the unique combination of a
number of variables, not reducible to any of its subsets. To illustrate, he had made and
wore a necklace consisting of three interlinked chains, schematically shown in Figure 4,
which had the property of falling into separate chains once any one of them was cut.
Figure 5 shows a three-dimensional table of frequencies whose distribution is typical
of a non-decomposable interaction between all three variables, which can be seen in the
corresponding breakdown of the overall transmission measures. The zero values of the
Figure 4. Ashby’s chain necklace.
C
B
A
200
200
200
200
0
0
0
0
T(B:C) = 0.00
Q(ABC) = 1.00
T(A:C) = 0.00
T(A:B) = 0.00
T(A:B:C) = 1.00
Figure 5. Frequency distribution with Q(ABC) fully accounting for T(A:B:C).
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binary transmission measures may be seen as justified as the projections of the
three-dimensional distribution onto its three two-dimensional tables are uniform and
exhibit no structure, and the three-dimensional distribution could not possibly have been
predicted from them.
We uncritically accepted that zero values for the Q-measures, as exemplified in Figure
6, signalled the absence of interactions.
As students we computed many of these accounts by hand, using an n log2 n table,
which was tedious without electronic computers, and we followed Ashby’s lead to
generalise information theory to any number of variables, which was easier than
computing their numerical quantities. This effort culminated in the publication of two
lists of some 50 accounting Equations (Ashby 1969), amounting to the beginning of
an elaborate information algebra. The Q-measures were Ashby’s prime candidates.
By extending McGill and Garner’s Q-terms to fewer and to more than three variables
QðAÞ ¼ 2HðAÞ;
QBðAÞ ¼ 2HBðAÞ;
QBCðAÞ ¼ 2HBCðAÞ;
QðABÞ ¼ QBðAÞ2 QðAÞ ¼ QAðBÞ2 QðBÞ ¼ TðA:BÞ;
QCðABÞ ¼ QBCðAÞ2 QCðAÞ ¼ QACðBÞ2 QCðBÞ ¼ TCðA:BÞ;
QðABCÞ ¼ QCðABÞ2 QðABÞ ¼ QBðACÞ2 QðACÞ ¼ QAðBCÞ2 QðBCÞ
QðABCDÞ ¼ QDðABCÞ2 QðABCÞ
¼ other expressions by permutation of these variables;
QðABCDEÞ ¼ QEðABCDÞ2 QðABCDÞ
¼ other expressions by permutation of these variables; etc:;
a general accounting equation emerged (Ashby 1969, p. 6). In its terms, we assumed able
to quantitatively decompose the total amount of information transmission T in a system of
any number of variables into its unique interaction quantities Q:
TðA:BÞ ¼ QðABÞ;
Q(ABC) = 0.00
139
T(B:C) = 0.35
694
T(A:C) = 0.35
0
0
T(A:B) = 0.35
139
T(A:B:C) = 1.05
555
0
139
Figure 6. Frequency distribution with zero Q(ABC).
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by definition
TðA:B:CÞ ¼ QðABÞ þ QðACÞ þ QðBCÞ þ QðABCÞ;
TðA:B:C:DÞ ¼ QðABÞ þ QðACÞ þ QðADÞ þ QðBCÞ þ QðBDÞ þ QðCDÞ þ QðABCÞ
þ QðABDÞ þ QðACDÞ þ QðBCDÞ þ QðABCDÞ etc:
Stated generally:
TðSÞ ¼
X
a,S
QðaÞ;
where S is the set of variables of a chosen system and a is a subset of S of two or more
variables.
Accounting for the complexity of a system in terms of additive quantities was
appealing to many researchers (Broekstra 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981, Conant 1976, 1980).
I too developed equations and algorithms for simplifying complex systems in these terms
(1974), and aimed at a spectral analysis of multi-valued relations (1976, 1978, 1981).
Nevertheless, despite the compelling logic and obvious simplicity of these accounting
equations, suggesting that Q-measures would quantify higher-order constraints, for
example, present in Figure 5 and absent in Figure 6, there remained something odd: Q
could be negative, as may be seen in Figures 7 and 8.
McGill (1954) had acknowledged this possibility and considered any deviation from
zero a signal that interaction existed in the data. Ashby deferred to his interpretation, and
we all continued developing this calculus. The promises of an algebraic account of
complexity were too appealing to be wrong.
However, observe in Figure 7 that any two of the three projections onto the
two-dimensional faces of the cube are sufficient to reconstruct or uniquely determine its
0
Q(ABC) = –1.00
0
T(B:C) = 1.00
400
T(A:C) = 1.00
0
T(A:B) = 1.00
0
T(A:B:C) = 2.00
400
0
0
Figure 7. Sparse frequency distribution with negative Q(ABC).
69.5
Q(ABC) = –0.25
69.5
T(B:C) = 0.35
T(A:C) = 0.35
69.5
T(A:B) = 0.35
69.5
T(A:B:C) = 0.80
624.5
69.5
69.5
624.5
Figure 8. Frequency distribution with negative Q(ABC).
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three-dimensional distribution, incidentally much like the example in Figure 3. The third
projection is redundant, implied and not needed to obtain that distribution. If T(A:B:C) ¼
T(A:B) þ T(A:C), a third-order interaction should be absent by this conception, yet
Q(ABC) has a value other than zero. In fact, it seemingly corrects for redundant measures,
here of T(B:C). This suggested to me that the Q-measures did not only respond to
higher-order interactions but also compensated for the over-determination by redundant
lower-order interactions. If true, this finding would cast serious doubt on the ability of
Q-measures to indicate the presence or absence of higher-order interactions. For example,
the projections of the distributions in Figures 6 and 8 onto its faces are the same, as evident
in T(A:B) ¼ T(A:C) ¼ T(B:C) ¼ 0.35. But the distribution in Figure 6 is most unlike
chance or maximally entropic, satisfying the three two-dimensional distributions and
therefore suggesting the presence of an interaction, stronger than in Figure 8, but not
measured by Q. We all followed a faulty logic.
3. A gestalt switch
Meanwhile, George Klir (1976) had picked up on Ashby’s constraint analysis (Ashby
1964). At the 1978 conference of the Society of General Systems Research, Klir (1978)
presented a paper reporting his explorations. Two seemingly unimportant things struck
me. First, whereas Ashby diagrammed systems in terms of his set theoretically motivated
‘diagram of immediate effects’ (Ashby 1964a) between variables, the variables being
represented by boxes and the effects by lines, as in Figures 1 and 2, Klir had inversed that
convention, putting the effects among variables into boxes and showing variables as lines
Figure 9. Lattice of simplifications of models of systems in four variables without loops.
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connecting them. This simple gestalt switch allowed me to visualise interactions inside
Klir’s boxes, without lines connecting variables. Second, whereas Ashby dealt with
interactions algebraically, as an unordered list of quantities that summed to a total, Klir
presented an algorithm for generating a lattice of simplifications of the models of a system
from the most to the least complex one, covering the same set of variables in each case,
shown in Figure 9 involving four variables.
In effect, each of Klir’s models consisted of several components which (a) were shown
as linked through the variables they shared, (b) contained all subordinate interactions and
(c) could be ‘degraded’ into simpler ones by removing components that defined
interactions, one by one. Although Klir was not concerned with information theory, his
lattice visualised the relationships between the components of a system and implied an
ordering of the interactions to be removed. This suggested to me that each simplification
could be linked to a specific information quantity. Indeed, with variables named A, B, C
and D, the leftmost path of six steps up the lattice in Figure 9 amounts to this accounting
equation:
TðA:B:C:DÞ ¼ TðC:DÞ þ TðA:DÞ þ TðB:CÞ þ TCðB:DÞ þ TDðA:CÞ þ TCDðA:BÞ
Another path through this lattice would have produced the same six terms save for their
order and permutations of the variable names.
But as a cybernetician, I could not help noticing the conspicuous absence of circular
relations within Klir’s models. An examination of these models revealed that whenever an
interaction among three or more variables was absent or analytically removed – Ashby’s
idea – all lower order interactions formed models with loops. The accounting equations in
terms of Q-measures hid these facts. Figure 10 shows the lattice of all possible models
involving four variables, half of which happen to be models with loops.
With such lattices, it became easy to reconceptualise the information quantities of
interest, not in terms of Q-measures, but in terms of the differences between the maximum
entropies within any two models, one being a descendent of the other. Figure 11 shows a
schematic lattice and the measures of interest, where m0 is the original and unanalysed
whole system, mind is the model of the system with all of its variables regarded as
independent, mi is a simplification of m0 and mj is simplification of mi regardless of the
number of steps involved.
Figure 11 also shows how the total amount of information transmitted within a system
can be algebraically decomposed into quantities along a path of simplifications of models
of m0, within a lattice of possible models:
TðmindÞ ¼ Iðm0 ! mindÞ ¼
Xi¼ind21
i¼0 Iðmi! miþ1Þ:
This gestalt switch was conceptual and enormously convenient notationally. But the
information quantities could be applied only to Klir’s models without loops. The biggest
nut to crack was how to cope with systems that did contain circular relations among its
constituent variables.
4. Information in circular systems
Shannon called his theory A Mathematical Theory of Communication and attended to
processes that proceeded in one direction only. Accordingly, a message received could have
no effect on the message sent. Noise that entered a channel could only degrade what was
communicated. A prior choice necessarily limited subsequent choices. It could not have
International Journal of General Systems 197
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Figure 10. Lattice of all possible of models of systems in four variables.
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an effect on itself. This linearity may not have been entirely intentional as Shannon
constantly struggled with notions of feedback, how a corrupted message could be restored,
which implied an observer who could refer back to the original. But his theory was grounded
in a far more basic conceptual commitment: probability theory. Probability theory
axiomatically requires that the probabilities in any one set sum to 1, and expected
probabilities of joint events are obtained by multiplication of the probabilities of their
components.
Shannon’s second theorem (Shannon and Weaver 1949, p. 19) relied on the
logarithm function which converts products into sums, and established that the entropy
function was the only function that afforded the intuition of information being an
additive quantity. This additivity is fundamental to all the entropy and information
quantities defined above. However, as it turns out, the additively that created the
Q-measures violate the axiom of probability theory. This may be seen when expressing
Q in terms of probabilities:
QðAÞ ¼
X
a[A
palog2pa ¼ 2HðAÞ;
QðABÞ ¼
X
a[A
X
b[B
pablog2
pab
papb
¼ TðA:BÞ;
QðABCÞ ¼
X
a[A
X
b[B
X
c[C
pabclog2
pabc
pabpacpbc
papbpc
;
QðABCDÞ ¼
X
a[A
X
b[B
X
c[C
X
d[D
pabcdlog2
pabcd
pabcpabdpacdpbcd
pabpacpadpbcpbdpcd
papbpcpd
; etc:
All numerators of these expressions are proper probabilities:
P
a[Apa ¼ 1,P
a[A
P
b[B pab ¼ 1, etc. and so is the denominator in Q(AB):
P
a[A
P
b[Bpapb ¼ 1.
mind
m0
mi
mj
I(m0 →mind) = T(mind)
I(m0 →mi)
I(mi →mj)
I(m0 →mj)
Figure 11. Generalised lattice of all possible models of a system m0 and information measures of
their differences (with interactions successively removed).
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But the denominators, starting with Q(ABC), no longer are:
P
a[A
P
b[B
P
c[C
pabpacpbc
papbpc
– 1;
P
a[A
P
b[B
P
c[C
P
d[D
pabcpabdpacdpbcd
pabpacpadpbcpbdpcd
papbpcpd
– 1; etc: Thus, for three or more variables, the
denominators of Q are not probabilities, and Q-measures are incompatible with the 2nd
theorem of information theory, which presumed probability theory to be able to obtain
expected or maximum entropies.
This incompatibility with probability theory stems from the fact that removing unique
interactions from systems with three or more variables, which Ashby wanted to
distinguish and into which he wanted to decompose complex systems, created circular
relationships among the remaining components. However, obtaining maximum entropy
probability distributions of systems by multiplying their component probabilities assumes
linear relationships among them. Thus, circularities in systems defy the possibility of
obtaining maximum entropy probability distributions by multiplication. None of us who
applied information theoretical measures to complex systems at this time realised this
mathematical limit of probability theory. In retrospect not seeing this right away is all the
more surprising as circularity is fundamental to cybernetics.
However, the idea of additive quantities that measure the unique contributions of
higher-order interactions in systems (leaving circularities behind) can be retained by
calculating the maximum entropy probability distribution, subject to the constraints of
the probabilities of its components – not by multiplication – but by following the
circularity iteratively, going around and around the circle, through each component, in
either direction, until that joint probability is found. Solomon Kullback (personal
communication) directed my attention to an algorithm developed by Darroch and
Ratcliff (1972), which I could adapt for this purpose (Krippendorff 1982a, 1982b).
Omitting here a generalization of this algorithm to fixed and zero probabilities, which are
considered elsewhere (Krippendorff 1986), this algorithm is defined as follows:
It yields the maximum entropy distribution of probabilities vabc . . . (expected by
chance) in the variables of a system m0, satisfying the constraints of components K1: K2:
. . . :Ke: . . . :Kr of the model mi of m0. In terms of these maximum entropy probabilities the
amount of information in the original system m0 but excluded from mi becomes:
† Let pabc . . . be the joint probabilities of variables A, B, C, . . . of a system m0 chosen
for analysis
† Given a model mi of m0 consisting of r components K1: K2: . . . :Ke: . . . :Kr (Klir’s boxes), each
defined by a subset of the system’s variables, jointly covering all.
† Let pke be the probabilities within the eth component Ke of mi obtained by summing over all
values ke [ Keof variables not in Ke: pke ¼
P
ke[ Ke
pabc ...
† Set all cells abc . . . [ ABC . . . to vð0Þabc ... ¼ 1=NABC ... , where NABC . . . is the number of cells
in ABC . . .
Iterate t ¼ 0, 1, 2, . . . until vðrtþeÞabc ... ¼ vðrtþe21Þabc ... for all components Ke.
For all components: Ke, e ¼ 1, 2, 3, . . . , r
For all cells abc . . . [ ABC . . . , compute: vðrtþeÞabc ... ¼ pke vðrtþe21Þabc ... =
P
ke
vðrtþe21Þabc ...
 
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Iðm0 ! miÞ ¼
X
abc ...[ABC ...
pabc ... log2
pabc ...
vabc ...
:
The difference between any two models mi and mj of the system m0, mj being a
descendant of mi, then becomes:
Iðmi! mjÞ ¼ Iðm0 ! mjÞ2 Iðm0 ! miÞ ¼
X
abc ...[ABC ...
pabc ... log2
vabc ... ðmiÞ
vabc ... ðmjÞ
;
which associates quantities of information with the expressions in Figure 11.
Unlike what Q was thought to measure, Figure 8 exemplifies a system without ternary
interactions, unlike in Figure 5, which manifests such interactions. With the new quantities
in place, the correct account of the data in Figure 5 are shown in Figure 12. Here, it may be
observed that the information in the two bivariate components AB and AC add to the
information in AB:AC, but the third BC (in this case any third binary component) adds less
to a model consisting of all three bivariate components AB:AC:BC. The unique interaction
(deviating from the distribution of frequencies in Figure 8) has a positive value.
I presented these developments at a 1980 conference on cybernetics in Vienna
(Krippendorff 1982a), once and for all disposing of Q as a viable measure in information
theory, showing that we all, McGill (1954), Garner (1962), Ashby (1969), Broekstra
(1976, 1977, 1979, 1981), Krippendorff (1976, 1978, 1979a, 1979b), and many more –
excluding Conant, who never trusted the Q-measure – were wrong in assuming we could
account for interactions in systems with loops algebraically, when we should have
followed the circularity in these system iteratively. Thus, when mi is decomposed into
miþ1 by removing just one interaction, the unique contribution of that interaction, which
Ashby had conceptualised, is measurable not by Q but by I(mi! miþ 1), the entropy
present in mi and absent in its successor miþ1. I am sure Ashby would have been pleased
to see this development, especially since it proved us all mistaken.
The above algorithm added a new chapter to Shannon’s theory: the possibility of
measuring the information flows in systems with loops, which had heretofore defied
adequate accounts and it added a meaningful measure of the complexity of systems. Martin
Zwick has put my old program and several recent developments on his website http://www.
pdx.edu/sysc/research_dmm.html (last accessed 20 May 2008). Martin also reminded me
that log-linear modelling has fully embraced the iterative computation of probabilities for
interactions with loops.
5. Material and informational numbers
One can say that Shannon’s information theory foremost is a theory of limits. It states
limits on how much information can be transmitted through a noisy channel of
0
I(ABC →AB:AC:BC) = 0.70 ≠ Q(ABC)139
I(AB:AC:BC →AB:AC) = 0.10 ≠ T(B:C)694
I(AB:AC →AB:C) = 0.35 = T(A:C)
0
I(AB:C →A:B:C) = 0.35 = T(A:B)
139
I(ABC →A:B:C) = 1.50 = T(A:B:C)
555
0
139
Figure 12. Correct account of interactions in Figure 6.
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communication, on the decipherability of encoded messages without knowledge of the
key, and in Ashby’s terms, on the ability to regulate a system that faces disturbances.
Crucially is that it takes for granted the existence of differences. Gregory Bateson (1972,
p. 381) defined information as ‘any difference which makes a difference in some later
event’. But differences do not exist in nature. They result from someone drawing
distinctions and noticing their effects. Therefore, substituting ‘recognizable change’ for
‘difference’ leads one to something that can be recognised and observed. Ashby was
interested in whether there was a limit to that recognition, a limit that cannot be overcome,
even with all conceivable technological advances.
It was fortuitous for Ashby to meet Hans-Joachim Bremermann at the second
conference on self-organising systems. Bremermann (1962) recognised that
information transmission or information processing systems need to respond to
differences, which cannot be arbitrarily small, thus entailing a limit, not part of
information theory. In terms of Einstein’s mass–energy equivalence and Heisenberg’s
Uncertainty Principle, he argued that the transmission or processing capacity of any
circumscribable system, artificial or living, cannot exceed
mc2=n bits per second;
where
m ¼ the mass of the system (including its power source)
c ¼ the velocity of light
n ¼ Plank’s constant
By inserting the two constants, Bremermann concluded that
No material system can exceed a processing capacity of approximately 2 £ 1047
bits per second per gram of its mass.
To get a sense of this limit, Ashby presented us with several humbling numbers:
From which Ashby (1968) concluded:
Everything material stops at 10100.
This is a pretty solid limit. But cyberneticians, he argued, are concerned mainly with
another kind of number. True to his conception of cybernetics as the study of all possible
systems that is informed (constrained) by what cannot be built or found in nature, he was
led to enumerate possibilities rather than actual observations and the numbers that
emerged may be called combinatorial or informational. For example,
Times A distinguishable atomic event takes ø 10210 s
One year ø p £ 107 s
Time since the earth solidified ø 1020 s
Mass Mass of the Earth ø 6 £ 1027 g
Counts Number of atomic events since the earth
solidified ø 1030
Number of atoms in the visible universe ø 1073
A computer the size of the entire Earth,
operating at Bremermann’s limit could
perform no more than 2 £ 1047 £ 6 £ 1027 ø 1075 bits/s
or 1075 £ p £ 107 ø p £ 1082 bits/year
Since the earth solidified, that ideal computer
could have computed no more than 1020 £ 1075 ø 1095 bits
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The enormity of these numbers and the fact that they often appear as exponents of 2 is one
reason for expressing them in log2 or ‘bits’ rather than in actual counts. Ashby (1968)
concluded that
Cyberneticians have to cope with numbers q 10100
with material resources for computation p 10100.
Eight years before I concluded my part in the development of information theory, in 1972,
I attended a conference on cybernetics in Oxford, England where we learned from the
cybernetician, Gray Walter, that Ashby was mortally ill with a brain tumour. Another former
Ashby student from Switzerland, by the name of Burckhardt (regrettably, I am not recalling
his first name), and I took a train to visit him. His wife told us to be brief and not to mention to
him the terminal nature of his situation. I gave him a copy of my conference paper
(Krippendorff 1974) drawing on his work. He was pleased and promised to read it when he felt
better. We saw the working space he had set up after retiring in 1970 from Urbana to a
beautiful old school house with a lovely garden. When asked what he intended to do once he
got better, he told us of planning a book that would start with Bremermann’s limit. Subsequent
inquiries did not turn up notes of how he would have proceeded. Roger Conant (1981c) edited
Ashby’s writings. I kept his idea in mind.
6. A paradigm shift
Meanwhile, computational technology made enormous leaps. Cybernetics became more
self-reflective to the point of suggesting its evolution from first-order to second-order
cybernetics. I pursued interests far removed from Bremermann’s limit, the design of human
interfaces with technology (Krippendorff 2006). Such interfaces cannot be understood
without the participation of human agency, the ability to draw distinctions, decide among
the alternatives thus distinguished, and act accordingly – without rational prescriptions or
pre-established determinisms. Bremermann’s finding implicates human agency by stating
not what exists but what we CAN or CANNOT do within the laws of physics.
Given that we can cope with numbers beyond available computational resources,
Ashby’s conclusion can signal two things. Either numbers.10100 are meaningless or our
dominant epistemology has not kept up with the technology we are facing today. I favour
the latter and have distinguished four epistemologies regarding understanding systems
(Krippendorff 2008).
. Systems whose behaviour is deducible from a finite history of recorded observations
are observationally determinable. This reflects the epistemological stance of
detached observers who seek to discover a system’s properties by testing all possible
hypotheses about that system’s structure against the data it produces.
Possibilities: Number of configurations displayable by an
array of 20 £ 20 ¼ 400 light bulbs, which
are either on or off ¼ 2400 ø 10120 . 10100
Number of non-trivial machines (Foerster 1984)
with only 3 binary inputs and 4 internal states 213,297 ø 3 £ 104002q 10100
Number of images presentable on a HDTV screen
with 1920 £ 1080 pixels and 32 bits for colour 22,073,632 ø 10624,000s 10100
Number of distinctions between good and bad
images on that screen ø 21 followed by 624,000 zeros
qq 10100
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. Systems that can be built and set in motion are synthetically determinable. This
reflects the epistemological stance of designers who know the structure of a system
having determined its makeup.
. Systems that can be utilised by skilfully interacting with them are hermeneutically
determinable, contemporary computers, for example.
. Systems that can be understood by participating in them are constitutively
determinable. The latter applies to social systems, constitutively involving knowl-
edgeable human participants. This includes what second-order cybeneticians do.
Theorising the experiences with the above-mentioned ‘Ashby box’, Heinz von Foerster
(1984) has shown that observational determinability is limited to trivial machines – systems
with few states and simple structures. Non-trivial machines, involving internal memories,
defy observational determinability but can be understood by building them or taking them
apart and reassembling them. Computers, for example, are non-trivial by this definition. They
can be built but hardly understood by merely observing what they do. The designer of
non-trivial systems faces informational limits as well, however, these limits concern the
number of components available to them. The history of computing started with programming
small procedures, assembling them to larger and larger procedures. The elements of current
computer languages are far removed from the changes in zeros and ones they ultimately
control – but always within the limit of what designers can handle. Most competent computer
users have no clue and do not need to care about how their machines are built and function yet
have no problems learning how to use them. Indeed, computers are designed for hermeneutic
determinability. It is when users install software and reconfigure their interfaces that they
approach being designers – at least of the contours of what is going on inside them. Computer
users deal with information quantities other than computer designers. These quantities have to
do with the details that users can distinguish among the pixels on their computer screens and
how fast they can change them by their actions.
I suggest that information processes of the kind we are facing today can no longer be
understood by discovering and identifying interactions in observed systems.
Reconstructability analysis, for example, quickly runs into transcomputational numbers.
In a little known paper, Conant (1981b) found a way to bypass Bremermann’s limit by not
selecting a solution from all possible alternatives but constructing a solution based on a
simpler representation of the problem. In effect, he moved beyond the limit of
observational determinability by designing a solution. Technology is not discovered, it is
designed. To understand technology requires an understanding of how possibilities are
created and realities are constructed within them. Bremermann’s limit merely defines the
space within which human agency is physically possible.
7. Cyberspace
Considering the above, space is not a metaphor or a mathematical artefact. Space is
created and recognised by human actors in the process of realising (making real) their
artefacts. It is a way to understand human abilities, is manifest in the auxiliary verb ‘can’
and becomes evident in material artefacts that could not emerge in unattended nature and
be explained causally or entropically. Space is constituted in the possibilities that human
actors perceive in their world. Here are five propositions concerning that space.
(i) Actions consume possibilities. For example, writing a document occupies a certain
amount of space – on paper or in computer memory – thereafter not available for
expressing other things.
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(ii) Choices among possible actions have consequences, often social ones, i.e. pertaining to
other actors. For example, dialling a telephone number establishes a connection with
someone at the expense of connecting with someone else, or building a house not only
changes a landscape, but where neighbours might build theirs.
(iii) Choices among technologies almost always trade constraints on less important
possibilities for desirable possibilities that would not be available otherwise. For
example, using the telephone limits communication to voice within a narrow bandwidth,
but extends the ability to converse with people at distances far greater than could be
reached acoustically.
(iv) The human use of technology is limited to the possibilities it provides in human
interfaces with them. For example, the human use of cyberspace is limited to what
computer interfaces enable their users to do.
(v) Computers may amplify human intelligence (Ashby 1956b) when the choices made by
their users initiate processes that select among a far greater number of possibilities, for
example, searching on the internet within seconds for something that would take
humans a lifetime. The openness experienced by internet users makes it difficult if not
impossible to formulate a single elegant theory of cyberspace.
History of cyberspace
Cyberspace consists of technologically supported possibilities for human actions. To me,
cyberspace originated when early humans found sticks, stones, and fire to be separable
from where they could be found and moved to where they might accomplish something
previously thought impossible. As such sticks, stones, and fire may have been the first
human artefacts. The path from that early beginning to where we are now took several
millennia of technological development.
What has changed during this remarkable history, in my view, is due less to an increase
in information, as current writers on information society insist, than to an increase in our
collective ability to draw more and finer distinctions, to recognise more and finer
differences, to handle, assemble, use, and communicate what we distinguished more
efficiently than before, and to construct worlds that enhance our collective ability to realise
ourselves. The great Cheops pyramid, built 5000 years ago during a 20 year period,
amounted to moving 2.3 Billion stones into a descriptively very simple arrangement.
The mass production of same-size bricks enabled the building of a great many and
descriptively far more complex kinds of buildings. Writing, using combinations of letters
from a small alphabet of characters added choices not available to painting naturalistically.
The largest library of ancient times, the Royal Library of Alexandria, destroyed by fire
about 2000 years ago, is estimated to have held between 40,000 and 700,000 books and
scrolls among which users had about 106 binary choices. For comparison, the collection of
printed matter of the US Library of Congress is estimated to contain 10-terra bytes
(Lyman and Varian 2003), including the characters its collection contains, about 1014 bits
or 10,000 times the size of the library of Alexandria. The searchable World Wide Web
contains about 136 times the number of bits in the Library of Congress. Already the library
in Alexandria featured principles of mechanics and hydraulics that could be combined and
generated numerous inventions. The 2000 years between the library of Alexandria and the
World Wide Web witnessed numerous milestones. Gutenberg’s invention of movable type,
mass production of freely combinable technological artefacts, the printing press, Hollerith
punch cards, radio tube computers, and digital communication. All afforded us options
previously unavailable or time consuming. To me, the history of human technology is one of
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increasing the number of possibilities we can use to our advantage. Cyberspace began well
before electronic possibilities emerged although the latter certainly have dwarfed all previous
technologies in how much they offer.
The current size of cyberspace (Krippendorff 2009, pp. 299–321)
Existing communication and computer technology operates far from Bremermann’s limit.
But one may appreciate the size of the space it collectively offers by estimating the
unconstrained possibilities it currently provides.
. A byte is an atomic unit of data in a computer, increasingly used by computer
manufacturers to quantify information processing and storage capacities. It consists
of an 8-bit sting of 0s and 1s or eight binary variables and can keep 256 different
characters. However, since I am interested in the choices human actors can
collectively make rather than how data are stored inside a computer, I prefer to
express possibilities in terms of the number of binary choices they enable.
Accordingly one byte ¼ 8 bits.
. A contemporary 200 gigabyte computer can store 200 £ 109 bytes, or
200 £ 8 £ 109 ¼ 1.6 £ 1012 bits.
. With an estimate of one billion (109) 200 gigabyte computers (personal and
midrange servers) in use in 2008 worldwide (to err by exaggeration) one could
collectively make 109 £ 1.6 £ 1012 binary choices or store 1.6 £ 1021 bits of data.
. Considering the speed of computation, say 1 GHz ¼ 109/s, during one year of
continuous processing – 1 year ø p £ 107 s – we could collectively compute about
1.6 £ 1021 £ 109 £ p £ 107 ø 5 £ 1037 bits, bringing the cyberspace that we can
explore in 2008 to an upwardly rounded:
1038 bits per year
This growing number is large but far smaller than p £ 1082, the capacity of a computer
of the mass of the earth running for a year at Bremermann’s limit. According to Moore’s
law, which suggests that the capacity of computation doubles every two years,
Bremermann’s limit would be reached in about 150 years. Since p £ 1082 is practically
unachievable, Moore’s law is soon doomed. Cyberspace may then become more
user-friendly and integrated in everyday life but no longer grow as fast as it is now.
There is of course much happening outside computer technology, not reflected in these
numbers. People grow and eat food, drive cars to work, construct buildings and cities,
publish, read, and communicate with one another. However, as observed by Lyman and
Varian (2003), most of what is happening outside the electronic world migrates into it.
Economic transactions may still take place at a cash register but are recorded
electronically and tracked in this medium. Cars are used to accomplish a great many
things, but their production drawings, sales documents, repair records and service
instructions are transmitted among the manufacturer’s computers. Through registration
numbers, insurance and repair records cars occupy cyberspace. Books, newspapers and
theatrical performances increasingly are available online. Web pages are read and inform
decisions outside cyberspace but their results reenter cyberspace variously. Everything in
cyberspace is connected to what I call externalities via their users. These externalities are
essential to keeping cyberspace meaningful and alive but they do not add significantly to
its estimated size.
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Artefacts in cyberspace
Unlike traditional machines, which are designed to serve particular functions, the utility of
cyberspace depends on the artefacts with which it is furnished. Electronic artefacts consist
of documents, software, and networks that define dependencies among finite numbers of
binary variables.
As a matter of definition, artefacts in cyberspace
(1) Occupy space (in bits of cyberspace) by relating individual bits, for example, the
neighbourhood relations among the pixels of images, the strings of characters
comprising written documents, and the codes of computer software. The relations
among otherwise free possibilities in which artefacts are manifest are precisely what
Ashby had conceptualised as higher-order interactions and hoped to discover and
quantify with the ill-fated Q-terms. Artefacts in cyberspace do occupy space, but
identifying their structure by observation (observational determinability) is virtually
impossible while their structure is easily established by design (synthetic
determinability).
(2) Selectively interact with one another, form clusters of cooperative ecologies due to
interface protocols, common programming languages, or storage in proximity of
each other.
(3) Are preserved under a variety of recursive transformations (Foerster 1981), for
example, during their transmission. Artefacts cannot be experienced at their
location but where they are reproduced, in the process of their communication, or
while doing actual work. While relatively stable the location of artefacts in
cyberspace remains mostly uncertain.
(4) Can be controlled, installed, composed, removed, activated, monitored, and
terminated by their users (not necessarily by everyone alike).
(5) Are meaningful in their users’ lives in the sense of being understood and usable
(hermeneutic determinability) and relate to the cultural externalities of cyberspace.
Let me mention a few kinds of artefacts by their properties:
The artefacts that determine the size of cyberspace are physical memories, hard drives,
storage devices, media of communication, and networks. These artefacts do not physically
move. The rates of their production less their retirement determine the growth of
cyberspace.
A prerequisite of working computers are their operating systems. As each computer
needs to be equipped with one, operating systems occupy a good deal of cyberspace. This
also includes the software for running the user interfaces with computers, usually part of a
computer but doing no work other than providing users access to cyberspace by bridging
user cultures with the operation of computers.
Data, textual, visual and sound records, files, and web pages, usually kept as whole
documents, are the most common, most space consuming, and least intelligent artefacts.
They largely inform individual users about externalities. Lyman and Varian (2003)
estimated that most computers hold no more than 1% original data, the remainder are
duplicates, representing redundancies in cyberspace. Duplicates replicate traditional mass
media products and compete with libraries. Specialised software is first of all data, until it is
instructed to cooperate with the operating system and compute data other than themselves,
combining them, or connecting them with each other on own or other computers.
Links among documents, web pages, and the organization of file systems occupy
cyberspace as well, and so are transmissions, i.e. networks that temporarily coordinate
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computers for the purpose of reproducing data from one location to another. Traffic in
contemporary cyberspace consumes a considerable amount of cyberspace.
The need for privacy, allocating privileges, and protecting data bases has created security
systems that organize cyberspace around communities of users with the effect of limiting
access to it.
Another increasingly important category of artefacts is intelligent assistants or agents that
either learn to serve user needs as a function of their habits or can be instructed to assume
chores that the user prefers not to undertake or cannot undertake as speedily, reliably, or
efficiently as an assistant.
Finally, there are self-replicators, viruses, worms, and other artefacts substantially out
of users’ control. Often designed with malicious intent, they can make their way through
cyberspace and create havoc to individual computers, hard drives, databases and networks.
Self-replicators may be difficult to destroy, but because they occupy space as well, they
often can be quarantined.
One can argue over the categorization of such artefacts but not that they are designed,
programmed, or captured to aid users’ practices. Except for the self-replicators, which are
a nuisance precisely because they cannot easily be controlled, electronic artefacts provide
access to possibilities generally not available otherwise. Without a diverse population of
artefacts, cyberspace would be an empty shell.
Despite claims that Shannon’s quantities have little to say about everyday life, we
experience these quantities everywhere. When buying a computer, we pay for the size of
memory in bytes and speed. When considering installing software, we must be wary of
how much valuable space it consumes. When attaching images of Kilobyte size to an
email, we need to be concerned with how long it takes to send them and whether they can
be received. Bits or bytes are measures of the space that the hardware of cyberspace opens
to their users and that the other artefacts exhaust by enabling their users to do
computational work, communicate with each other, and most importantly, to move among
and explore the artefacts in cyberspace.
Human interface capacities
The size of cyberspace exceeds by far several individual capacities, a fact that limits
human interaction with computers and how we can operate in cyberspace. Whereas
Bremermann’s limit concerns physical responsiveness to differences, here I am concerned
with the implications of human responsiveness to cyberspace.
. Individual comprehension – for Ashby – must be accomplished by the 1013 to 1015
synapses of the human brain, most of which are occupied with coordinating human
bodily functions and are unavailable for perception. Experiments have suggested
that human comprehension is about two bits per second or 2 £ p £ 107 bits per year.
With one billion (109) computers in use, attended to 10% per day, the current
population of cyberspace users could comprehend about 2 £ p £ 107 £ 109 £
1021 ø 1016 bits of cyberspace annually.
. Comprehension does not mean responding to every letter, pixel, or option available
on computer screens. Perception is selective and holistic and what appears on an
individual’s computer screen necessarily is richer than can be perceived and be
responded to. A computer screen with 1280 £ 1024 pixels, 32 bits for colours,
75 Hz refresh rate, observed 10% of a year by one billion computer users would
take up not more than 1280 £ 1024 £ 32 £ 75 £ 1021 £ p £ 107 £ 109 ø 1022
bits of cyberspace per year.
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. Typing probably is the fastest way to direct the performance of a computer. If a very
good typist can write about one word/second, a word contains on average 5.5 characters
(as in this article), each character amounts to log232 ¼ 5 bits, then one year of typing,
10% of each day, by 109 cyberspace users could determine 5.5 £ 5 £ p £ 107 £
1021 £ 109 ø 1017 bits of cyberspace annually – just ten times what one can
comprehend.
The order of magnitude of these differences, rough as they may be, is not surprising.First,
typing instructs a computer just ten times as much as can be comprehended. This may well be
the difference between understanding whole words as opposed to individual letters. Second,
the amount of information that can be displayed must always be far greater than what can be
comprehended. Perception is selective and each letter of an alphabet occupies more than 32
pixels plus 32 bits for colours. We see and think in chunks, not pixels. Third, although I do not
dare to estimate the cyberspace occupied by all of its artefacts, (a) computer languages, data
bases, software and networks have histories of cumulative growth that exceed the lifespan and
creativity of individual users, thus naturally exceeding the 1017 bits per year of typing.
(b) Many artefacts enter cyberspace not by individual construction but by being captured by
powerful systems, digital cameras, medical imaging, video recorders, and surveillance
systems that operate with minimal human involvement. The volume they fill far exceeds
human comprehension and ability to enter them bit-by-bit. (c) The majority of artefacts in
cyberspace are copies. Lyman and Varian (2003) estimate as much as 99% on individual
computers. Copies are easy to produce. Directing a device to download, copy or transmit an
artefact may require very few human actions. The amount actually looked at and individually
comprehended is a miniscule fraction of what occupies cyberspace. Fourth, artefacts
in cyberspace are packages of bits and organised to be controllable by users with a minimum
of choices. Getting to an image may need no more than a few clicks with a mouse. Applying a
familiar statistical program on available data does not require the user to know the details of
what it does, nor the data it analyses. The volumes searched on the internet remain largely
hidden from the user’s view.
While cyberspace must be larger than the artefacts it houses, it is perfectly sensible to
conclude that the space they collectively occupy far exceeds human comprehension and
the human ability of designing them and that their growth expands cyberspace as well. Far
more important and unique to this technology is the unoccupied cyberspace. This is a
measure of the openness for users to exercise their agency, make individual choices
without rational justification, doing things not programmable by any computer language,
travelling paths nobody paved for them, and constructing new artefacts to support one’s
own practices of living and share their use with others to live and co-create that space.
As long as these artefacts do not consume the whole cyberspace or prevent access to most
willing users, the possibility of human agency is preserved.
8. Conclusion
It should be clear that what we now call cyberspace cannot remotely approximate
Bremermann’s limit. Much of the earth consists of hot or dull matter and much of our
biomass is concerned with itself. Although computation has become indispensable to
contemporary society and everyday life, it can always only be a part of it. Estimating the
size of cyberspace is an important step in acknowledging human agency as a non-
naturalist explanation of the world we construct. It invokes a new paradigm. Ashby’s
method of first considering possibilities and then exploring which are empirically
sustainable and which are not is neither inductive – generalising from many cases – nor
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deductive – deriving knowledge from known theory – but evolutionary – rooted in the
idea of the recursion of mutation and selection (Bateson 1972). Ashby (1956, p. 2)
defined cybernetics as the study of all possible systems that is informed (constrained) by
what cannot be built or found in nature. I suggest this ushered in a paradigm that enables
us now to study the increasingly complex human use of information technologies which I
describe as cyberspace.
Ross Ashby could not experience the technology we live with, which rapidly evolved
from the mainframe computers he knew. His conception of a system did not exhibit the
fluidity we are now facing. His notion of higher-order interactions in systems of many
variables has morphed into the artefacts in cyberspace – occupying finite spaces but being
difficult to localise and no longer identifiable by algebraic accounting equations. They can
no longer be identified by observation, but by construction on the part of experts, and by
handling them on the part of users. Equating them as packages of bits, created by software
companies, programmers, and users, manipulable and useable seems natural to us now.
This article has shown, I hope, that creating artefacts in cyberspace goes far beyond the
computational resources available to discover their complexities from their outside.
The paradigm shift from methods of discovery to methods of design has overcome the
computational limits on analysis and reconstructability and outdates the approach taken by
earlier systems theories.
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